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Charles 0. Galvin *
I. WILLSCONSTRUCTION. The supreme court's decision in Perry v. Hin-
shawI highlights problems of construction associated with the dis-
tinction between individual and class gifts. Lydia Hinshaw's will
granted Hattie Peterson a life estate in certain rental property. Upon ter-
mination of the life estate one-half of the rental property was to go to
Lydia's sister, and the remaining one-half was to be shared equally among
the surviving brothers and sisters of Lydia's husband listed in the will. 2
Hattie Peterson was also the residuary beneficiary under Lydia's will.
Lydia died in 1976. At the death in 1978 of Hattie Peterson, the life
tenant, the only surviving remainderman was Vera Perry, a sister of
Lydia's husband. Vera contended that because she was the last surviving
member of a class that included Lydia's sister and Lydia's husband's
brothers and sisters, she was entitled to all the designated property. The
residuary beneficiaries under Hattie Peterson's will contended Vera was
entitled to only one-sixth of one-half of the designated property, and that
the balance passed under the residuary clause of Lydia's will to Hattie
Peterson and thence to the residuary beneficiaries of Hattie Peterson's wil.
The trial court held that: (1) Lydia did not intend to make a class gift of
the remainder; (2) each named remainder person was entitled to the partic-
ular share designated; (3) Vera, as the only survivor, was entitled to only
one-sixth of one-half of the rental property; and (4) the balance of the
particular rental property fell into Lydia's residuary estate, thus passing to
Hattie Peterson and thence to the beneficiaries under Hattie Peterson's
will. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that when the beneficiaries in
B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;
S.J. ., Harvard University. Centennial Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; formerly
Professor of Law and Dean, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 633 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1982).
2. The will provided specifically that:
Upon the death of Hattie Peterson, I direct that the rental property from
which the said Hattie Peterson, was receiving the rentals during her life time,
be divided among the surviving sisters and brothers of myself and my beloved
husband in the following manner: to my sister, Mrs. Hattie Hohhof of Chi-
cago, Illinois, one-half (1/2); and the remaining half to be divided equally,
share and share alike, among the surviving brothers and sisters of my beloved
husband, D.E. Hinshaw, the same being William Hinshaw, Fannie Steele,
Cosa Frensley, Luda Jones and Vera Perry, share and share alike.
Id. at 504.
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a class are named, the gift is to the named beneficiary, and the class
description is merely for identification. 3 The court of appeals found Vera
was the only survivor to take her one-sixth of one-half share, and that the
remainder of the bequests lapsed, falling into Lydia's residuary estate.
The lapsed gifts, therefore, should pass under the will of Lydia's residuary
beneficiary.4
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that the one-half devised
to Lydia's sister lapsed and fell into Lydia's residuary estate, but that the
one-half devised among the surviving brothers and sisters of Lydia's hus-
band passed outright to Vera as the sole survivor of that class. 5 The court
held that the essential ingredient for this construction was the use of words
of survivorship. 6
This case serves as a signal to draftsmen concerning the distinction be-
tween class and individual gifts. The lesson it teaches is that a gift by T of
Blackacre, share and share alike, to the survivors of A, B, and C would all
go to C, if C was the only person in the group to survive T. On the other
hand, a gift by T of Blackacre, share and share alike to A, B, and C (with
no words of survivorship) would go one-third to C if he were the only one
to survive T. The remaining two-thirds, the specific devises to A and B,
would lapse and fall into T's residuary estate.
Karsten v. Nuhl7 illustrates the importance of clearly expressing the tes-
tator's intent in the words of the will. The testator, John Perkins, died in
1968 leaving as survivors his widow, Leila, three children by a previous
marriage, and a minor grandchild. John's will left all his property in fee
simple to his surviving wife, but specially provided that "in the event my
wife shall sell any of our properties, then one-half (1/2) of the net proceeds
realized from the sale of said community properties. . . shall be divided
equally between my said three (3) children." John's will further provided
that in the event of a sale, the three children and the grandchild must join
as grantors. In 1973 Leila, the surviving wife, made a gift of certain prop-
erty to her sister, Myrtle Muhl, and reserved to herself a life estate in the
property. Leila died in 1976 leaving all her proeprty to Myrtle.
Following Leila's death, John's children brought an action in trespass to
try title against Myrtle Muhl. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court denying that the children had an interest in the property. 9
The court stated that when the words of the will are clear and unambigu-
3. Id. at 753; see Benson v. Greenville Nat'l Exch. Bank, 253 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hagood v. Hagood, 186 S.W. 220, 226 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1916, writ ref'd).
4. 625 S.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981).
5. 633 S.W.2d 503, 505.
6. Id. On the issue of survivorship the court stated: "Lydia Hinshaw's will contains
words of survivorship. Clearly, Vera Perry, as sole survivor of the brothers and sisters of
D.E. Hinshaw, is entitled to an undivided 1/2 interest in the rental property." Id.
7. 624 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
8. Id. at 683.
9. Id. at 684.
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ous, the testator's intent must be derived from the instrument itself. 10
John's will provided for a bequest to his children only in the event of a sale
of community property; Leila's transfer to Myrtle was by gift. The court
held, therefore, that the children were not necessary parties to the deed of
transfer and had no claim on the property. "1
The case demonstrates a point of draftsmanship. In all probability John
intended that his second wife enjoy the property for her life, but if she
disposed of any item, he intended that his children by his previous mar-
riage have the benefit of the property or the proceeds from the transfer.
The fact that he used the term sale rather than transfer or disposition af-
forded his second wife the opportunity to transfer the property to a mem-
ber of her family, retaining the use for life. This circumvented what John
probably meant to occur, but the inadvertence in drafting made the result
unchallengeable. ' 2
Probate-Revocation. In Morris v. Morris13 Sue Morris made application
for the probate of the will of her husband, Floyd Lee Morris, Sr. The
deceased's two sons filed a contest alleging that the deceased did not have
testamentary capacity,' 4 that the will was not properly executed and at-
tested, and that the decedent had taken steps to revoke the will. The jury
found that the decedent did have testamentary capacity, that he under-
stood the provisions of the will, but that he had revoked the will. The
critical testimony was that: (1) the decedent had directed the proponent
Sue to destroy the will; (2) Sue had taken a business envelope and torn it
into shreds; and (3) the decedent believed that the will was destroyed. In
fact the will was not in the envelope and was not destroyed. The trial court
instructed the jury that if the deceased had instructed Sue to destroy the
will, and if she destroyed in his presence an instrument he believed to be
his will, then the will was revoked.
The appeals court reversed, holding that the trial court's jury instruction
on the revocation issue was erroneous.' 5 The court stated that a will can
only be revoked pursuant to the statutory method, and that method was
not followed in this case.' 6 The contestants sought in the alternative to
10. Id. The court cited Gee v. Reed, 606 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. 1980) (courts must
construe the will as a whole), and Huffman v. Huffman, 161 Tex. 267, 271, 339 S.W.2d 885,
888 (1960) (if the words are clear and unambiguous the testator's intent must be derived
from the words alone).
II. 624 S.W.2d at 684.
12. The court concluded: "We cannot ... distort the clear meaning of Testator's words
to rewrite the will and find that he intended a devise of property conditioned upon any
disposition of property when, throughout his will, Testator consistently and specifically re-
fers to sale of property . I..." d. (emphasis in original).
13. 631 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler), aft'd, 642 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1982).
14. 631 S.W.2d at 189. The contestants alleged that Sue, her attorney, and her attor-
ney's secretary had subjected the decedent to pressure and influence while he was ill, and
thus persuaded the decedent to execute an instrument as his will when he did not have
testamentary capacity. Id.
15. Id. at 192.
16. Id. at 191-92; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 63 (Vernon 1980) (provides that a will
may only be revoked "by a subsequent will, codicil, and declaration in writing, executed his
1983]
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impose a constructive trust on the decedent's estate because of Sue's fraud.
The appellate court noted, however, that the will's only devisee was Floyd
Lee Morris, Jr. and that Sue was not a beneficiary under the will, but
merely trustee for the decedent's sons. The appellate court held that to
impose a trust on the innocent beneficial owner because of the fraud of
another would not be proper.' 7
This case presented a dilemma. On the one hand, it is clear that the
decedent meant to revoke his will and that the proponent's fraud pre-
vented this result. On the other hand, the beneficiary under a valid will
who was innocent of fraud should be entitled to the benefits of the will,
irrespective of the fraud of a third party. The court's resolution subverted
the testator's intention, but followed the statutory mandate.' 8
Probate--Execution. Fleming v. Wich 19 involved the question of the
proper form of execution and attestation of a will. The will was a four-
page typewritten document. The substantive provisions of the will ended
in the middle of the third page, followed by the signature of the testatrix.
The self-proving affidavit began immediately after the testatrix's signature.
A second signature of the testatrix, accompanied by the only signatures of
the two witnesses, appeared on the bottom of the third page at the conclu-
sion of the self-proving affidavit. The issue presented to the court of ap-
peals was whether or not the witnesses' signatures, which appeared only in
the self-proving affidavit, but were signed on the same page and at the
same time as the testatrix signed her will, were sufficient to satisfy the stat-
utory requirement for witnesses to a will.20
In reaching its conclusion the court considered the decision in Boren v.
Boren .21 In that case the supreme court held that the witnesses' signatures
on the self-proving affidavit were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of witnesses for the will itself.22 The court distinguished Boren, holding
that because the subscribing witnesses' signatures in this case appeared on
the same page the will ended they were "on the face of the will itself," and
this was sufficient compliance with the statutory mandate. 23
life formalities, or by the testator destroying or canceling the same, or causing it to be done
in his presence").
17. 631 S.W.2d at 193. The court cited Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.
1977) (constructive trust imposed on property devised to beneficiary who had killed
testator).
18. Another factor is that Sue Morris had complained to Floyd Morris, Sr. about being
left out of his will. Thus, her action in not destroying the will at the direction of the testator
was against her own interest in the matter. 631 S.W.2d at 190.
19. 638 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1982, writ granted).
20. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN'. § 59 (Vernon 1980) provides that wills not wholly in the
handwriting of the testator must be attested by two witnesses who must sign the will in the
presence of the testator.
21. 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966) (self-proving affidavit was placed on a separate page).
22. Id. at 729.
23. 638 S.W.2d at 35.
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On a motion for rehearing, the court refused to follow Jones v. Jones,24 a
case factually similar to the instant case. In Jones the witnesses sigied
twice, once in the second line of the self-proving affidavit and once at the
end of the affidavit. As in the instant case the first set of witnesses' signa-
tures appeared on the same page as the testator's signature. Nevertheless,
the Dallas court of appeals in Jones held that the witnessing was not prop-
erly performed and refused to admit the will to probate. 25
The court distinguished Jones by noting that in the instant case the exec-
utrix sought probate of the will as an "attested written will," 26 thus making
the language of the self-proving affidavit superfluous. 27 The court appar-
ently assumed that it could ignore the language of the affidavit, but retain
the signatures following it and use it as part of the will. This reasoning is
somewhat strained, and it appears the court placed great weight on the fact
that applying the Boren rule in this case would allow a technicality to de-
feat the testatrix's, intent.28
Reagan v. Bailey29 involved a related but more difficult question.
Mable30 Warren executed a will in proper form. Later, while an attorney
and notary public were in her home on other business, she produced an
instrument, declared it to be a codicil to her will, signed it in the presence
of the two parties, and had them sign in her presence and in the presence
of each other. There were no lines on the will for the witnesses' signatures.
The attorney signed to the left of the testatrix's signature and underneath
his signature wrote the word witness. The other witness, a notary public,
signed the document using the acknowledgement form on the codicil and
placed thereon his notarial seal.
The contestant contended that the codicil was invalid because the signa-
ture of a notary in his official capacity cannot also serve as a signature of a
witness. The court distinguished those cases involving the sufficiency of a
self-proving affidavit from the instant case, noting that a self-proving affi-
davit requires different formalities than a codicil.3' The court stated that a
decision to admit the codicil to probate was supported by sufficient case
law,32 citing among others an early Texas Supreme Court case holding
that the execution by a notary will also qualify as an execution by a wit-
ness.33 The court also found important the fact that the notary appeared
24. 630 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd).
25. Id. at 647-48.
26. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 84(b)(1) (Vernon 1980) provides that if an attested written
will is not self-proved the will may be proved in court by the sworn testimony of one or more
of the witnesses thereto.
27. 638 S.W.2d at 35-36.
28. Id. [Editor's Note: After this Article went to print the Supreme Court of Texas
reversed this case. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 312 (Apr. 9, 1983). The supreme court's opinion will
be covered in the next Survey.]
29. 626 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Also spelled Mabel in the opinion.
31. 626 S.W.2d at 142.
32. Id.
33. Franks v. Chapman, 64'Tex. 159, 161 (1885) (county court clerk's signature in offi-
1983]
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in his capacity as a witness at the time the will was offered for probate. 34
These cases illustrate the extreme care one must exercise to execute a
will properly. Strict adherence to the Probate Code provisions relating to
execution and attestation may yield harsh results in particular cases, but
the statutory requirements are necessary to prevent fraud against the estate
of the testator.
Probate-Testamentary Capacity. In Wood v. Stute35 the testatrix disin-
herited her daughter. The daughter contested her mother's will on the
grounds that it had been executed under undue influence from the testa-
trix's son. The evidence showed that the son had referred his mother to his
personal attorney, and that the attorney had prepared the will. Evidence
was also presented that the mother relied on the son for advice in making
business decisions. The court held that merely because the testatrix's son
advised his mother and referred her to counsel in certain matters did not
make a case for undue influence. 36
Procedure-Limitations on Actions. In Escontrias v. Apodaca 37 the testa-
trix's will was admitted to probate on December 12, 1974. On June 6,
1978, a group of heirs brought suit against the two independent co-execu-
trices of the estate to set aside the will on the grounds that the testatrix
lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that two years had elapsed from the time the will was admitted to
probate. 38 The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the
defendant executrices had the burden of proving not only that two years
had elapsed from the time of probate, but also that no undue influence was
exercised. 39 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals
and affirmed the trial court, holding that the independent co-executrices
met their summary judgment burden by showing that the heirs could have
reasonably made the discovery of any undue influence or lack of testamen-
tary capacity within two years from the time the will was admitted to
probate. 4°
The case is interesting because the evidence revealed that, just prior to
the execution of the will, the testatrix had undergone two operations for
cial capacity also sufficient in capacity as witness). The court also cited: Mosler v. Johnson,
565 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (immaterial
where on will witnesses sign as long as they sign for purpose of attesting will and testimony
of the witnesses may serve to explain purpose of their signatures); Saathof v. Saathof, 101
S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, writ refd) (signature by notary public satis-
fied requirement of signature by witness).
34. 626 S.W.2d at 142.
35. 627 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
36. Id. at 541.
37. 629 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1982).
38. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 1980) provides for a two-year period of limi-
tations on suits contesting the validity of a will.
39. 624 S.W.2d 600, 601-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981).
40. 629 S.W.2d at 698-99.
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the removal of blood clots from her head. The plaintiff heirs were not
permitted to visit the testatrix from the time of the first operation until her
death. The heirs stated that during this time the testatrix's attitude toward
them changed drastically. In 1975 they knew the terms of the will "did not
seem right."'4 ' Apparently, however, the legal significance of these facts
was not known until they consulted with a lawyer in 1977.42 In summary,
they slept on their rights until it was too late to file suit.
Procedure-Right to Sever, Right to Intervene. Barrows v. Ezer 43 involved
a complex procedural maze. The will of George R. Canada was admitted
to probate in county court in 1958. The will named Charles Ezer as in-
dependent executor and created a trust with Canada's widow and Ezer as
co-trustees. The testamentary trust provided that Mrs. Canada was the life
beneficiary, and upon her death the assets would be transferred to a second
trust of which Charles Ezer and Gil Phares would be co-trustees. The
trustees were to make various bequests out of the second trust and then
deliver the remainder to Ezer.
Mrs. Canada died in 1978, and Phares refused to act as co-trustee. Ezer
brought suit in the district court in 1978 to determine how to carry out the
trust. George H. Canada, the only son of the testator and a beneficiary
under the second trust, was named defendant. He counterclaimed that the
will was invalid and sought to impose a constructive trust on the property
obtained by Ezer under the will. The district court dismissed Canada's
counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction and granted the relief sought by Ezer
by appointing a co-trustee and ordering distribution of the trust assets.
Canada appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim, but did not appeal the
district court's order of relief. The court of civil appeals in a case styled
Canada v. Ezer44 held first that the district court was correct in ruling itself
to be without jurisdiction to hear the will contest because that part of the
counterclaim was a collateral attack on the will in probate and was, there-
fore, an attack on the jurisdiction of the county court.45 Second, the court
held that the district court did have authority to hear evidence and to rule
on that part of Canada's counterclaim dealing with the imposition of a
constructive trust.46 The court reversed and remanded the case to deter-
mine the constructive trust issue.47
Meanwhile, Canada filed a will contest over his father's will in county
court, and subsequently transferred the action to the district court. On a
motion to the district court, Ezer consolidated the will contest with the
previous constructive trust litigation. At the same time Ezer was successful
in severing the issue of the relief granted by the district court, that is, the
appointment of the co-trustee, and the order of distribution of trust assets.
41. Id. at 698.
42. Id.
43. 624 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
44. 584 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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Canada appealed the order of severance. Simultaneously, other heirs
sought to intervene and to consolidate their causes relating to the Canada
estate with the basic action between Canada and Ezer. On Ezer's motion
the trial court denied the intervention, and the opponents also appealed
this order.
Thus, the posture of the matter in the instant case on appeal was as
follows: (1) the court consolidated the will contest and the constructive
trust issue; (2) the court severed the issue of the order of appointment of
the co-trustee and the delivery of the trust assets to Ezer; and (3) the court
denied the intervention of the other Canada heirs. The issues before the
court on appeal were whether the severance and intervention holdings
were correct.
In ruling on the severance question the court of civil appeals stated that
the issues on the appointment of the co-trustee and the delivery of the
remaining trust assets to Ezer were decided in the initial hearing in the
district court. Canada failed to complain about these issues in his first
appeal; therefore, the court held that under the "law of the case" doctrine
48
Canada had waived his right to question that portion of the district court's
judgment.49 Because these issues on the order granting relief must there-
fore stand as decided, the court held they were properly severed from the
other issues.50 With respect to the issue of intervention, the court held that
the trial court should have granted the intervenors a hearing to determine
if they had the requisite pecuniary interest in the estate of Canada.5l The
matter was accordingly reversed and remanded, thus leaving the interven-
tion issue and the constructive trust issue still open.
This case is a classic presentation of procedural problems. Canada's will
was admitted to probate in 1958, and Ezer was named independent execu-
tor and trustee. Twenty years later when Ezer raised in the district court
the issue of the appointment of his co-trustees, he started a chain reaction
that caused others to challenge the original will and to seek to impose a
constructive trust. One would expect that at the trial on the merits the
question of the statute of limitations would surely be raised concerning the
challenge to a will admitted to probate in 1958.
Procedure-Jurisdiction of County and District Courts. In re Estate of Mer-
rick52 held that the acts creating the county courts at law of Lubbock
48. The court defined the "law of the case" doctrine as "that principle which states that
questions of law decided on appeal to a court of ultimate last resort will govern the case
throughout all of its subsequent stages, including a retrial and subsequent appeal." 624
S.W.2d at 616 (citing Kropp v. Prather, 526 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ
ref d n.r.e.); Houston Endowment, Inc. v. City of Houston, 468 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Allied Fin. Co. v. M.T. Shaw, 373
S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
49. 624 S.W.2d at 617.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 617-18.
52. 630 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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County53 gave such courts original jurisdiction over general probate mat-
ters under Texas Probate Code section 5.54 In this case the application for
probate was filed in the Lubbock County Court. Another related action
was filed in the Taylor County Court and thereafter transferred to the
Lubbock County district court. Pursuant to Texas Probate Code section
8(c)(1), 55 the court of civil appeals held that the transfer from Taylor
County should have been to the Lubbock County court as the proper court
possessing venue priority.56 A district court is to have probate jurisdiction
only when no statutory county court has been created.
57
Administration-Administrator's Settlement without Court Authorization. In
Catlett v. Catlett58 the court had before it a question of construction of
Texas Probate Code section 234(a)(4). 59 In Catlett an administrator insti-
tuted an action on behalf of the estate. During the trial the parties reached
a settlement, which the administrator assented to in open court without an
order from the probate court. Thereafter, the probate court ratified the
settlement. Subsequent to this ratification, the administrator sought to re-
voke his consent to the settlement on the grounds that he had acted with-
out authority from the probate court. The court, however, found that a
settlement, made without authority, is voidable but not void.60 The court
held in the instant case that the subsequent ratification by the probate
court cured the lack of authority, thus precluding the administrator from
revoking his consent. 6'
Administration-Jurisdiction of Probate Court to Issue a Temporary Injunc-
tion. In Onoray Davis Trucking Co. v. Lewis62 Davis Trucking sought to
foreclose upon property securing a promissory note. The property was
part of an estate in the process of administration, and the executrix ob-
tained a temporary injunction enjoining the foreclosure sale. Davis Truck-
ing challenged the authority of the probate court to issue an injunction.
The court held that Texas Probate Code section 5(d) authorizes a probate
court to enjoin a foreclosure sale of properties that are part of an estate.63
53. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1970-340, 1970-304.1 (Vernon Pamph.
Supp. 1965-1982).
54. 630 S.W.2d at 503. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon 1980) vests probate juris-
diction in the statutory probate courts, county courts at law, and concurrently in the district
courts where no statutory courts have been created.
55. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 8(c)(1) (Vernon 1980) provides for transfer to the court
having priority of venue.
56. 630 S.W.2d at 504.
57. Id. at 503.
58. 630 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ reed n.r.e.).
59. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 234(a)(4) (Vernon 1980) provides: "When a personal rep-
resentative [of an estate] deems it for the interest of the estate, he may, upon written applica-
tion to the court, and by order granting authority .... (4) make compromises or settlements
in relation to property or claims in dispute or litigation .... " (emphasis added.)
60. 630 S.W.2d at 483 (citing Hughes v. Hess, 141 Tex. 511, 172 S.W.2d 301 (1943)).
61. 630 S.W.2d at 483.
62. 635 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).
63. 635 S.W.2d at 624. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980) provides: "All
courts exercising original probate jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters inci-
dent to an estate .... "
1983]
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The order of the trial court authorizing the injunction was affirmed.64
Administration-Claim for Attorney's Fees. In Anderson v. Anderson 65
Wesley Anderson executed a will in which he created a trust for the benefit
of his minor children. He named his brother, J.C. Anderson, independent
executor of the estate and trustee. J.C. caused Wesley to change the bene-
ficiary designations of a life insurance policy and certain stock in favor of
himself, leaving the testamentary trust unfunded. After Wesley's death the
children through their next friend filed a will contest and a suit to set aside
the beneficiary designation under the insurance policy. At trial the court
ordered J.C. to obtain separate counsel for himself in his individual capac-
ity and in his capacity as independent executor. The will was admitted to
probate, but J.C. was denied appointment as the independent executor,
and the beneficiary designation of the life insurance policy was set aside.
The attorney who represented J.C. in his capacity as independent executor
withdrew as counsel. A claim for attorneys' fees was filed with the succes-
sor executor, Corpus Christi National Bank, which approved the claim.
Texas Probate Code section 243 requires payment of reasonable attor-
neys' fees to the executor for any proceedings involved in admitting the
will to probate, whether such proceedings are successful or not.66 In the
instant case, however, the court denied the claim on the grounds that:
(1) the attorney had filed the claim rather than the executor, as the statute
requires; and (2) even if the executor had filed the claim, it would be
against public policy to allow the claim against the estate on behalf of an
executor who had tried to defraud the estate.67 Chief Justice Nye dis-
sented on the grounds that the claim was properly presented, and the work
done was in good faith and pursuant to the trial court's order.68 A writ of
error has been granted in this case by the Texas Supreme Court. The
supreme court's opinion will be covered in the next Survey.
In another case for attorneys' fees, Paulus v. Lawyers Surety Corp. ,69 the
successor administrator sued a temporary administratrix for negligence in
managing certain estate properties. The administratrix and her surety ulti-
mately prevailed,70 but the probate court granted the successor administra-
tor's claim for recovery of attorneys' fees from the temporary
administratrix. The administratrix's surety paid the attorneys' fees and
then sought reimbursement from the administratrix as provided in the
64. 635 S.W.2d at 625.
65. 638 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ granted).
66. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (Vernon 1980) provides:
When any person designated as executor in a will, or as administrator with the
will annexed, defends it or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, and with
just cause, for the purpose of having the will admitted to probate, whether
successful or not, he shall be allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses
and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, in such proceedings.
67. 638 S.W.2d at 58.
68. Id. at 59-60.
69. 625 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Snell, 617 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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surety contract. The administratrix contended she was not obligated to
reimburse the surety because the probate court's order granting the claim
for attorneys' fees was not a final adjudication. The court held that the
probate court's order was final as it conclusively adjudicated the disputed
issue.71 Thus, the court found under the surety contract the administratrix
was required to reimburse the surety for the attorneys' fees it had paid.72
Administration-Widow's Allowance. In Noble v. Noble73 the county court
awarded the decedent's widow a widow's allowance, 74 and the decedent's
son by a prior marriage appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that Texas Probate Code sections 287 and 288 require that the widow's
own resources be taken into account before a charge can be made against
her husband's estate.75 The court of appeals denied the allowance, finding
in this instance the widow's separate property was sufficient for her
maintenance. 76
Administration-Accounting Between Separate and Community. In Ander-
son v. Gilliland77 an independent executrix and widow of the decedent re-
fused to include as an asset of her husband's estate his right of
reimbursement for community funds he had expended to enhance the
value of his wife's separate estate. The widow contended that four months
before her husband's death he had given her a quitclaim deed relinquish-
ing whatever claim or interest he or his estate might have in the reimburse-
ment due the community estate. The court of appeals held that the right of
reimbursement was only a claim for money and not a right, title, or inter-
est in land that passed by the quitclaim deed.78 Accordingly, the amount
of reimbursement was properly includable in the community assets of the
decedent's estate. 79 Mr. Justice Stephens wrote a lengthy dissent in which
he contended that the surrounding facts and circumstances should be con-
sidered in construing the language of the quitclaim. It was clear the dece-
dent intended his wife to have her separate property free of any debt to the
community estate; the decedent by quitclaiming his "right, title, and inter-
est" undoubtedly believed that he was releasing the claim of the commu-
nity estate against his wife's separate property, and her testimony
corroborated this intent.80 The case is a close one and a significant illus-
71. 625 S.W.2d at 846.
72. Id.
73. 636 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
74. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 286 (Vernon 1980) provides for a widow's allowance for
one year from the death of the spouse.
75. 636 S.W.2d at 552; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 287 (Vernon 1980) (directing the
court to consider the facts and circumstances then existing and those anticipated to exist
during the year after such death); id. § 288 (no allowance shall be made when the survivor
has separate property adequate to the survivor's maintenance).
76. 636 S.W.2d at 553.
77. 624 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
78. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Tex. 1964)).
79. 624 S.W.2d at 245.
80. Id. at 248 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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tration of a strict legal construction prevailing over the ordinary or plain
meaning of words used by a layman to express his intent.
Administration-Accountingfor Decedent's Renewal Commissions. In Klein
v. Klein 8' the decedent was an agent for a casualty company with whom he
had a contract providing for commissions on policy renewals. Before the
decedent's death the company agreed to pay renewal commissions accru-
ing after his death to Donald, his son by a prior marriage. In the agree-
ment the decedent reserved the right to change the designation of the
beneficiary of these commissions. This agreement was dated April 9, 1979.
Subsequently, the decedent executed his will, dated June 9, 1979, naming
his wife, Annabelle, the principal beneficiary. After her husband's death,
Annabelle contended that the commissions belonged to her. The court
held that the agreement between the decedent and the company was a
third-party beneficiary contract for the benefit of Donald, 82 and that the
agreement was not testamentary in character so as to require compliance
with the statute of wills. 83 Accordingly, the decedent's will naming An-
nabelle as principal beneficiary did not revoke the designation of Donald
as the recipient of the renewal commissions. 84
The trial court had decided in favor of Donald on motion for summary
judgment. Because a fact question was raised as to the decedent's execu-
tion of the agreement for the benefit of Donald, the case was remanded for
further fact finding to determine the circumstances under which such
agreement was accomplished.
Joint Tenancy. A joint tenancy with right of survivorship has not been
favored under Texas law.85 Texas Probate Code section 46(a) provides,
nonetheless, that parties may create a joint tenancy by an agreement in
81. 638 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
82. Id. at 96. The court compared the beneficiary designation in the agreement to the
beneficiary designations in life insurance contracts. The latter are clearly third-party benefi-
ciary contracts. See Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Berwald, 97 Tex. 111, 76 S.W. 442 (1903);
Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hilderbrand, Contracts for the Beneft of Third Parties in Texas, 9 TEx. L. REV. 125 (1931).
83. 638 S.W.2d at 97; cf. Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Berwald, 97 Tex. I1I, 117, 76 S.W.
442, 445 (1903) (beneficiary of insurance policy has an interest in the policy before death of
insured); Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 319-20, 184 S.W.2d 823, 829-30 (1945) (discussing
rights of beneficiaries versus rights of estate of decedent in United States Savings Bonds);
Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ refd n.r.e.)
(employees in profit sharing plan had present vested though defeasible interest).
84. 638 S.W.2d at 97-98. The trial court held by summary judgment that the decedent
did not follow the procedure for changing the beneficiary of the policy renewal commissions,
which was defined in the agreement. Id. Similarly, life insurance beneficiaries may be
changed only as provided in the contract. See Kotch v. Kotch, 151 Tex. 471, 476-77, 251
S.W.2d 520, 523 (1952); Tips v. Security Life & Accident Co., 144 Tex. 461, 464-65, 191
S.W.2d 470,471-72 (1945); Garabrant v. Bums, 130 Tex. 518, 524-25, 111 S.W.2d 1100, 1104
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1938, opinion adopted); Wright v. Wright, 44 S.W.2d 1019, 1021-22
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, writ ref d).
85. See Weems v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 301 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (joint tenancy with right of survivorship not created by words "to be
held by them jointly"); Schroff v. Deaton, 220 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana




writing.86 Similarly, section 439(a) provides that if a party has signed a
joint tenancy agreement, money held in a joint bank account will pass to
the surviving party.87 Survivorship will not, however, be inferred from the
"mere fact that the account is a joint account. '88 In William Marsh Rice
University v. Birdwell89 the court determined that four bank accounts
passed outside the testator's will. The signature cards used on two of the
accounts in question used the term "survivor," which the court held raised
a presumption of an intention to create a joint tenancy with right of survi-
vorship.90 As to the other bank accounts, the court held that the provisions
of the testator's will, together with all the surrounding facts and circum-
stances, created a presumption in favor of the joint tenancy as to all bank
accounts. 9' These survivorship presumptions were not rebutted with clear
and satisfactory evidence, and the accounts properly passed outside the
testator's will. 92
Administration-Claim for Taxes. In State v. Blair93 J.W. Blair qualified,
in the Colin County Court, as administrator of the Hopson estate. In 1977
the state attorney general's office advised Blair that the estate owed certain
taxes. When Blair failed to pay the amount, the state sued in Travis
County and obtained judgment. Without causing the judgment to be certi-
fied, Blair procured a final accounting and an order of partition and distri-
bution in the Collin County Court. Subsequently, the state caused the
Travis County judgment to be certified and filed in Collin County. The
Collin County Court denied the claim.
The court of appeals held that the Travis County judgment was valid 94
and that the judgment's recitation that execution would issue, which was
contrary to rule 313 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,95 was not fa-
86. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Alexander v.
Bowens, 595 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Weems v. Frost Nat'l
Bank, 301 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980).
88. Id.
89. 624 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
90. Id. at 663;see Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 549-50, 359 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1962);
Alexander v. Bowens, 595 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Griffin
v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ); Brown v. Lane,
383 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd).
91. 624 S.W.2d at 664. The testator specifically indicated in his will that all joint bank
accounts had been excluded from the will and its administration. The probate court deter-
mined that the testator intended to create joint accounts with rights of survivorship even
though the bank cards were devoid of survivorship language. Due to a lack of findings of
fact, the court of appeals assumed that the probate court had sufficient evidence to deter-
mine the testator's intent. Id.
92. Id. The 1981 Texas Legislature made important amendments to § 46 with respect
to joint bank accounts with right of survivorship. Section 46(b) now permits spouses, by
written agreement, to arrange with financial institutions to hold either community or sepa-
rate funds in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
93. 629 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas), aff'd, 640 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1982).
94. 629 S.W.2d at 150.
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 313 provides:
A judgment for the recovery of money against an executor, administrator or
guardian, as such, shall state that it is to be paid in the due course of adminis-
19831
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tal.96 Additionally, the court held that the Texas Probate Code require-
ment that the judgment be certified to the Collin County Court within
thirty days of its rendition was directory, not mandatory,97 although the
language of the statute indicates to the contrary. 98 Finally, the court held
that Blair, as administrator of the estate and with full knowledge of the
outstanding judgment, had the affirmative duty to seek certification of the
Travis County judgment prior to the final accounting and partition of the
estate. 99 The Supreme Court of Texas has subsequently affirmed the
holding. 100
Administration-Executors'Authorit---Failure to Serve Process on Attorney
General. In Dallas Services for Visually Impaired Children, Inc. v.
Broadmoor 110 1 the testator died in 1965, leaving certain property to Jesse
Harris and Emma Kramer for life, with the remainder to Dallas Services
for Visually Impaired Children, Inc. a charity. The will named Harris and
Kramer independent co-executors with authority to sell the property if it
became necessary to preserve the testator's estate. The will also gave the
executors the same rights and powers a trustee has under the Texas Trust
Act. In 1968 Harris and Kramer, acting individually and as independent
executors, conveyed the property, and by mesne conveyances it came into
the possession of Broadmoor in 1973. Dallas Services contended that
Broadmoor had good title only to a life estate for the lives of Harris and
Kramer, and that the executors acted under invalid appointments because
the state attorney general was not made a party. Additionally, the charity
claimed that the executors, even if validly appointed, had no authority to
sell, and that the executors had acted after the estate was closed.
The court of appeals held that article 4412a, as it existed when the will
was offered for probate, did not require that the attorney general be made
tration. No execution shall issue thereon, but it shall be certified to the county
court, sitting in matters of probate,. to be there enforced in accordance with
law, but judgment against an executor appointed and acting under a will dis-
pensing with the action of the county court in reference to such estate shall be
enforced against the property of the testator in the hands of such executor, by
execution, as in other cases.
96. Since the judgment was otherwise valid, the court found the judgment to be "in-
dependent" of the direction to issue execution. 629 S.W.2d at 150. Additionally, the court
held that the direction with respect to execution was "surplusage" because execution issues
on any valid judgment that warrants execution.
97. Id. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (Vernon 1980) provides:
When a rejected claim or part thereof has been established by suit, no execu-
tion shall issue, but the judgment shall be certified within thirty days after
rendition, if of any court other than the court of original probate jurisdiction,
and filed in the court in which the cause is pending ...
98. The Dallas court of appeals in Blair adhered to the Texas Supreme Court's holding
in Chisholm v. Bewley Mills, 155 Tex. 400, 405, 287 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1956), which held that
failure to file a certified copy of the judgment within the thirty-day period does not bar an
otherwise valid claim. The supreme court found "It]he requirement that the judgment be
filed within thirty days was included merely to promote the prompt and orderly conduct of
the administration." Id.
99. 629 S.W.2d at 150; see Chisholm v. Bewley Mills, 155 Tex. 400, 405, 287 S.W.2d
943, 946 (1956).
100. 640 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1982).
101. 635 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ retd n.r.e.).
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a party to the probate proceeding in the case of the devise of a charitable
remainder. 10 2 Joinder of the attorney general was only required in pro-
ceedings to contest a will bequeathing money or property for charitable
purposes. 10 3 Here there was no contest, only the offering of the will for
probate. The court further held that the independent executors had power
to sell either because of outstanding debts against the estate,'°4 or because
the will gave the executors the same broad powers that a trustee has under
the Texas Trust Act.'0 5 Moreover, pursuant to Texas Probate Code sec-
tion 188,106 the purchasers were entitled to rely on the authority of the
executors to act. With respect to the issue of the executors' making the sale
after the closing of administration, the court held that so long as the estate
had not been formally closed by an affidavit under Texas Probate Code
102. Id. at 575. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4412a, § 2 (Vernon 1976) provides:
For and on behalf of the interests of the general public of this state in such
matters, the Attorney General shall be a necessary party to and shall be served
with process, as hereinafter provided, in any suit or judicial proceeding, the
object of which is:
a. To terminate a charitable trust or to distribute its assets to other than char-
itable donees, or
b. To depart from the objects of an charitable trust as the same are set forth
in the instrument creating the trust, including any proceedings for the applica-
tion of the doctrine of cy pres, or
c. To construe, nullify or impair the provisions of any instrument, testamen-
tary or otherwise, creating or affecting a charitable trust, or
d. To contest or set aside the probate of an alleged will by the terms of which
any money, property or other thing of value is given, devised or bequeathed
for charitable purposes.
The court noted that the statute was amended in 1981 in parts not material to the outcome in
Dallas Services. 635 S.W.2d at 575 n.2; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4412a, § 2(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). But see infra note 103 (discussing the impact of art. 4412a,
§ 2(a)(6) on the holding in Dallas Services).
103. In addition to the provisions on construction of estates creating or affecting charita-
ble trusts, the statute now requires joinder of the attorney general in any proceeding to
"determine matters incident to the probate and administration of an estate involving a chari-
table trust." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4412a, § 2(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
Although the scope of § 2(a)(6) has not yet been tested, it seems clear that the statute would
allow the attorney general to contest or offer for probate a will containing a charitable trust.
Whether or not the attorney general is now a necessary party to such a proceeding is unclear.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the attorney general's office will take an active role in every
probate proceeding involving a charitable bequest.
104. 635 S.W.2d at 576.
105. Id. Section 25 of the Texas Trust Act provides that, unless the settlor has provided
otherwise, a trustee shall have the power "to sell real or personal property at public auction
or at private sale" and "to execute and deliver any deed or other instrument ... necessary,
desirable or advisable for carrying out any of the [denominated] powers." TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-25(B), (G) (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1982-1983).
106. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 188 (Vernon 1980) provides:
When an executor or administrator, legally qualified as such, has performed
any acts as such executor or administrator in conformity with his authority
and the law, such acts shall continue to be valid to all intents and purposes, so
far as regards the rights of innocent purchasers of any of the property of the
estate from such executor or administrator, for a valuable consideration, in
good faith, and without notice of any illegality in the title to the same,
notwithstanding such acts or the authority under which they were performed
may afterward be set aside, annulled, and declared invalid.
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section 151(a),10 7 or by an order of the probate court under section
152(a),10 8 the purchasers were entitled to rely on the executors' authority to
act. 109
The holding in this case with respect to the question of closing adminis-
tration is particularly important. Frequently, an independent executor will
collect the assets, pay all debts, and distribute the estate properties, but will
not file an affidavit of closing or obtain a court order under Texas Probate
Code sections 151 or 152. Dallas Services indicates that without a formal
closing the independent executor may indefinitely continue to act indepen-
dently of the probate court. Those persons dealing with the executor,
therefore, should have no need to inquire further into his power to admin-
ister estate assets.
Administration-Conflict Between Will and Prior Deed. In Anderson v. An-
derson 10 the testatrix executed a will leaving her homeplace to her son,
Frank. Later, she executed a deed conveying the same property to her
granddaughter in return for the granddaughter's promise to care for her
for the remainder of her life. Approximately two years later, the grand-
daughter conveyed the property without consideration to William, another
son of the testatrix. The granddaughter never fulfilled her obligation of
support. The trial court set aside the deed, and the property therefore
passed under the will to the son, Frank. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the granddaughter obtained the deed of conveyance under
facts that showed she assented to and participated in a misrepresentation
as to the support obligation."' Furthermore, the court held that the con-
107. Id. § 151(a) provides:
When all of the debts known to exist against the estate have been paid...
and when the independent executor has distributed to the persons entitled
thereto all assets of the estate, if any, remaining after payment of debts, the
independent executor may file with the court a final account verified by
affidavit.
108. Id. § 152(a) states:
At any time after an estate has been fully administered and there is no further
need for an independent administration of such estate, any distributee may file
an application to close the administration; and, after citation upon the in-
dependent executor, and upon hearing, the court may enter an order closing
the administration and terminating the power of the independent executor to
act as such.
109. 635 S.W.2d at 578; see also Ford v. Roberts, 478 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (Probate Code §§ 151 and 152 provide statutory means for
closing independent administrations, overcoming common law presumption that adminis-
tration ceases one year after qualification of executor); Bradford v. Bradford, 377 S.W.2d
747, 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ refd n.r.e.) (independent administration
not closed until interested party files proper pleadings and county court declares administra-
tion closed); Marschall, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEX. L. REV.
95, 115 (1954) (discussing power of independent executors to close estates).
110. 620 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
I 11. Id. at 819; see also Chambers v. Wyatt, 151 S.W. 864, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1912, no writ) (general rule that failure to perform promise of support is not fraud justifying
cancellation of deed given in consideration for such promise is inapplicable when promise
was made to defraud and with no intention to perform). Texas courts, however, are reluc-
tant to find an intent to defraud and have, therefore, frequently held that the support re-
quirement was a covenant and not a condition subsequent. In this case the grantor's remedy
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sideration for the conveyance to the granddaughter totally failed." 12
Joint and Mutual Wills. A joint will is generally regarded as a single testa-
mentary document signed by two or more people disposing of their respec-
tive properties.'" 3 The instrument functions as a will for each party, is
subject to amendment by codicil, and may be revoked.' '4 A joint and mu-
tual will is a similar type instrument, but introduces the element of con-
tract. In such a will, the parties have not only made a testamentary
disposition pursuant to the Probate Code, but also each party has contrac-
tually agreed not to change the current dispository scheme. The mutual
testamentary obligations of the parties to a joint and mutual will become
irrevocable upon the death of one party. 1 5 In Baugh v. Myers"16 J.H. and
Evvie Myers, husband and wife, executed a will in which each left his or
her estate to the other to be used, enjoyed, or occupied during the life of
the survivor, then to certain heirs for life, followed by remainders over the
heirs' children. The will provided that none of the beneficiaries, with the
exception of the last taker, had the right to alienate, sell, or dispose of the
estate. After the husband's death, the surviving wife leased certain prop-
erty, giving the lessee an option either to re-lease or purchase the property.
An assignee of the lessee sought to exercise the option and obtain fee sim-
ple title. The court held that the will reflected an intention of each spouse
to bind the other contractually not to dispose of the estate other than as the
will provided." 17 Accordingly, the surviving wife did not have the power
to convey fee simple title." 18
By contrast, in Bridger v. Kirkland19 the court held that a joint will
executed by a husband and wife was not contractual in nature. ' 20 The sur-
viving spouse was not, therefore, precluded from revoking the joint will
after her husband's death, thereby altering the disposition of their prop-
erty. The court stressed the fact that the person who contends that a will is
contractual has the burden of establishing the contract, and no such evi-
is an action for damages for breach of contract. See Rozek v. Kotzur, 267 S.W. 759 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, no writ); Neyland v. Black, 238 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1922, no writ); Elliott v. Elliott, 109 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ denied).
112. 620 S.W.2d at 818-19. The obligation of support was the sole consideration recited
in the deed. Id.
113. See Harris v. Harris' Estate, 276 S.W.2d 964, 966 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, no
writ); J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDANT'S Es-
TATES AND TRUSTS 829 (6th Ed. 1982).
114. See Bishop v. Scoggins, 589 S.W.2d 151, 155-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ
ret'd n.r.e.); Garland v. Meyer, 169 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, no
writ).
115. See Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 244-46, 301 S.W.2d 621, 624-25 (1957);
Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35, 42-46, 273 S.W.2d 588, 593-95 (1954); Harrell v. Hickman,
147 Tex. 396,400-01, 215 S.W.2d 876, 878 (1948); Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 623-26, 193
S.W.2d 165, 167-69 (1946).
116. 620 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Id. at 911. The court stated that a "joint and mutual will creates contractual obliga-
tions between the signing parties to dispose of the property according to a plan." Id.; see
cases cited supra note 115 and accompanying text.
118. 620 S.W.2d at 912.
119. 628 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
120. Id. at 513.
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dence was adduced in this case.' 2' To the contrary, the court allowed the
attorney who drafted the will to testify that the two makers of the joint will
had made no reference to any contractual intent. The case is important
because it illustrates that, if a contractual will is intended, the parties
should affirmatively and positively indicate this intention in the will itself.
In the absence of clear declarations of the testators' intention, however, the
court may look to extrinsic evidence.122
II. TRUSTS
Construction-Powers. In Price v. Johnston 123 the will of Rose Morris cre-
ated two testamentary trusts: one for the benefit of the testatrix's daughter,
Cecile Morris Price, and one for the equal benefit of three grandsons, Rob-
ert, Harold, and Thomas. Each trust held an undivided one-half interest
in a house and the land on which it stood. Robert was the trustee of Ce-
cile's trust. The trust for the grandsons' benefit was terminated and, by
various conveyances, Harold became the outright sole owner of the one-
half interest in the house originally owned by the grandsons' trust. Robert,
as trustee of Cecile's trust, sold to Harold the undivided one-half interest
in the realty owned by her trust, making Harold the fee simple owner of
the property. Cecile sued to cancel this conveyance as outside the powers
granted under the Texas Trust Act. She also sought to remove Robert as
trustee of her trust for breach of fiduciary duty. Robert and Harold con-
tended that the provisions of the will that gave the trustee broad and gen-
eral powers overrode the Texas Trust Act provisions that preclude sales by
a trustee to a relative. On a motion for summary judgment Robert and
Harold prevailed.
On appeal the court held that, although the trustee was given extensive
powers, there was no specific provision authorizing the trustee to sell the
property to his brother, and that if the testatrix had so desired, it would
have been a simple matter to provide for such a sale in her will.' 24 Since
the will did not explicitly grant the trustee the right to sell to a relative, the
Texas Trust Act applied, thereby prohibiting the proposed sale.' 25 On a
motion for rehearing the court held, however, that should the evidence
show the trustee to have acted honestly and reasonably for adequate con-
sideration, the trial court could ratify the sale and excuse the trustee. 26
Accordingly, the cause was remanded with instructions. 27
121. Id.; see Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 623-26, 193 S.W.2d 165, 167-69 (1946).
122. 628 S.W.2d at 513; see Magids v. American Title Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 460, 467 (Tex.
1971).
123. 638 S.W.2d I (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 4. The Texas Trust Act provides that a "trustee shall not . . . sell, either
directly or indirectly, any property owned by. . . the trust estate. . . [to] a relative." TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b--12 (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1982-1983).
126. 638 S.W.2d at 4. The court reviewed the Texas Trust Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 7425-24E (Vernon 1960), which allows a court to relieve a trustee who has acted
"honestly and reasonably" from duties and limitations otherwise imposed by the Act. Id.
127. 638 S.W.2d at 4.
[Vol. 37
WILLS AND TRUSTS
Construction-Surcharge. In Epperson v. Greer128 the testatrix left her
ranch lands in trust for her son and his wife for life, then to their two
children, Jane and James, for their lives, with remainders over to the
grandchildren. Jane filed a suit for partition, accounting, and removal of
her brother as trustee. The parties reached a settlement in connection with
the case. Jane died and her husband, as executor of her estate, sought to
recover attorneys' fees as a surcharge against the trustee. The court held
that the award of attorneys' fees must have an express statutory provision
or contractual basis129 and that the Texas Trust Act provision allowing a
surcharge against a trustee could not by implication be construed to permit
personal recovery against the trustee for attorneys' fees.' 30 Moreover,
there was no finding of malfeasance or negligence for which a surcharge,
which is in the nature of a penalty, could be made. 13
Mr. Justice Cantu, dissenting in part but concurring in the result, wrote
that in an appropriate case, a trial court could in its discretion surcharge a
trustee for attorneys' fees.' 32 On the record in this case, however, he con-
cluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to
surcharge the trustee.' 33
Procedure-Notice to Beneficiaries of Litigation. Texas Trust Act section
19 requires that a plaintiff seeking recovery against a trust give notice to
the beneficiaries prior to the judgment. 34 In Republic National Bank v.
128. 626 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
129. Id. at 886-87; see, e.g., Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 803-04 (Tex.
1974); Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1962); King Optical v.
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
130. 626 S.W.2d at 886-87. The court reviewed in detail the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1974). In Knebel an execu-
tor proposed to sell the estate's stock to a corporation of which a co-executor was an officer,
director, and stockholder. Several devisees successfully set aside the sale by court action.
The devisees then sought to recover attorneys' fees from the estate under TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 352 (Vernon 1980), which provides that "[a]ll costs of the ... protest. . . if found
necessary, shall be adjudged against the representative." The supreme court held that an
award for attorneys' fees may be granted only under the express terms of a statute and may
not arise by implication. 518 S.W.2d at 803-04.
131. 626 S.W.2d at 885.
132. Id. at 887 (Cantu, J., dissenting in part). Mr. Justice Cantu pointed out that it may
be desirable to surcharge a trustee "if suit is brought against [him] upon a contract providing
for attorneys' fees or upon a tort alleging fraud or willful conduct." Id. at 888 (footnotes
omitted).
133. Id. at 888.
134. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-19(B) (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1982-1983)
provides:
No judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in such action unless
he proves that within thirty (30) days after the beginning of such action, or
within such other time as the court may fix, and more than thirty (30) days
prior to obtaining the judgment, he notified each of the beneficiaries known to
the trustee who then had a present or contingent interest, or in the case of a
charitable trust the Attorney General . . . of the existence and nature of the
action. ...
. . . If any beneficiary is a minor or has been adjudged incompetent, the
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem, whose duty it shall be to defend such
action.
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Robert Ventures, Lid. 35 a breach of contract action was filed against a
trust for the benefit of minor beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were not
given notice of the contract action, which was decided adversely to the
trust, until after the verdict was rendered. The court held that the benefi-
ciaries were entitled to show that at a trial on the merits they would have.
handled matters differently in protecting their interests in the trust. 136 Ac-
cordingly, the court remanded the breach of contract action for a retrial. 137
Administration-Sale by Independent Executor or Trustee. In Mcnnis v.
Corpus Christi National Bank 138 the trustors created a trust for their joint
lives and the life of the survivor, with a remainder to the survivor's estate.
The bank was trustee of the trust and independent executor of the survi-
vor's estate. After the survivor's death the bank sold certain stock that
subsequently increased in value. The estate beneficiaries sued, contending
that the bank exceeded its authority both as trustee, because the trust had
terminated, and as executor, because there were no claims against the
estate.
The court affirmed the trial court's holding that the bank sold the stock
pursuant to the authority of Texas Probate Code section 333, which autho-
rizes the sale of personalty that may deteriorate in value. 139 The stock in
question did not have an active market, was subject to substantial market
fluctuations, and had a low dividend return. Accordingly, the court held
that sufficient evidence of a probative nature existed to support the trial
court's findings that the bank acted in good faith.' 40
Constructive Trusts. A constructive trust is a creature of equity. If one is in
a fiduciary relationship or a relationship of confidence with another and
acquires property in violation of that relationship, a trust will be imposed
on the property in favor of the wronged party.' 4' In Sanchez v. Mat-
thews' 42 the parties jointly owned undeveloped land in which Matthews
held a one-fourth share. Sanchez held title to the property and contracted
for its sale under an arrangement through which he reacquired an interest
from the seller. Subsequently, he sold the interest at a substantial profit.
135. 637 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
136. Id. at 520-21. In Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 472(Tex. 1979), extensively reviewed by the Republic National court, the Texas Supreme Court
held that beneficiaries who were not given notice until after judgment were not entitled to a
new trial. The court's decision, however, turned on the beneficiaries' failure "to show any-
thing they would have done differently or in addition to what was done in defense of the
Trust liability." Id. at 476.
137. 637 S.W.2d at 521.
138. 621 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
139. Id. at 453-54. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 333 (Vernon 1980) provides in part:
The representative of an estate, after approval of inventory and appraisement,
shall promptly apply for an order of the court to sell at public auction or
privately, for cash or on credit not exceeding six months, all of the estate that
is liable to perish, waste, or deteriorate in value, or that will be an expense or
disadvantage to the estate if kept.
140. 621 S.W.2d at 453.
141. See G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (1978); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1, comment e (1959).
142. 636 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The court reviewed at length the nature of the fiduciary duty between joint
venturers. Because Sanchez, as manager of the venture, did not disclose
the full terms of the agreement to Matthews, the court imposed a construc-
tive trust on the proceeds of the second sale, requiring Sanchez to account
to Matthews for a one-fourth interest in the profits of the second sale.
143
The joint venturer's acquisition of the property through the use of confi-
dential information constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty such that he
was required to hold the property in constructive trust for the benefit of his
coventurers.44
By contrast, in Taub v. Ginther'45 Ginther and Warren, independent oil
and gas operators, assigned a two-thirds interest in an oil and gas lease to
Taub, who owned the remaining interest in the lease. Taub agreed to pay
the delay rentals on the entire tract for the bankrupt operators with an
understanding that they could receive a reconveyance of their two-thirds
interest by repaying Taub within six months. The six-month period ex-
pired. Later, Ginther and Warren executed a correction assignment to
remedy a typographical error in the original assignment and contended
that the assignee held the interest in trust for them. The court held that the
transaction was consummated at arms' length and that no basis for impos-
ing a trust existed.146
In this case no preexisting joint venture existed between Taub and the
operators. The court held that "[the fact that parties have had prior deal-
ings with each other and that one party subjectively trusts the other does
not create a confidential relationship."' 47 Taub had offered his assistance
in order to help the assignors who were in financial straits, but no fidiuci-
ary or confidential relationship existed between them.
III. GUARDIANSHIP
Reimbursement to Statefor Support. In State v. Whitaker' 48 the testatrix
died, naming Whitaker as executor of her estate and as guardian of the
persons and of the estates of her two sons, both of whom were non compos
mentis and residents of the Mexia State School for the mentally retarded.
She made certain insurance policies payable to the wards' estates, and her
will provided that the executor should establish a trust in the amount of
143. Id. at 459.
144. Id. at 458-59; see Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 372-81, 341 S.W.2d 401,
404-10 (1960); Tuck v. Miller, 483 S.W.2d 898, 904-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ
refd n.r.e.).
145. 631 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, writ granted).
146. Id. at 779-80; see also Vaquero Petroleum Co. v. Simmons, 636 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (preexisting confidential relationship did not justify
imposition of constructive trust when relationship had terminated and defendants were not
shown to have violated any fiduciary duty); Wheeler v. Blacklands Prod. Credit Ass'n, 627
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ) (creditor was entitled to constructive
trust on assets frauduently conveyed but not on all assets of debtor); Hatton v. Turner, 622
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (grantee's reassurance to other heirs of
grantor that he held property for their benefit justified imposition of constructive trust).
147. 631 S.W.2d at 780.
148. 638 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
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$7,500 to be used for the sons' last rites and burial. The State of Texas
brought suit to recover expenses the state incurred in the support and
maintenance of the two sons. The trial court concluded that the estates of
the two sons were in the form of trusts that did not constitute assets that
the state could reach under article 5547-300,149 the statutory provision for
recovery by the state of expenses incurred in the maintenance and care of
mentally retarded persons.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered, holding that the wards' es-
tates held by the testamentarily appointed guardian were not trusts so as to
enjoy the protection of the statute. 50 Moreover, the trust for last rites and
burial was not to be created out of the wards' estates, but out of the testa-
trix's probate estate. The testatrix had originally created an express trust
for the benefit of her sons, but by codicil subsequently revoked this provi-
sion of her will. Additionally, the testatrix had specifically created a trust
for the last rites and burial of her two sons. The court of appeals held
these two factors indicated that the testatrix did not intend to create a sup-
port and maintenance trust by implication.' 5' The state, therefore, could
reach all the proceeds of the insurance policies, plus certain amounts paya-
ble to the wards from the Veterans Administration . 52
Recovery of Attorneys' Fees. In Gordon v. Terrence 153 a daughter of the
ward sought removal of the ward's nephew as guardian on the ground that
she was the next of kin of the ward with priority of right to serve as guard-
ian and on the ground that the nephew had converted the ward's assets to
his own use. The probate court removed the ward's nephew as guardian
and allowed the daughter to replace him. Additionally, the probate court
granted recovery to the daughter of the value of certain property belonging
to the ward, plus her attorneys' fees. Reversing the probate court, the
court of appeals held that no evidence of any negligence on the nephew's
part existed that would support a recovery for the loss in property value. 54
With respect to attorneys' fees, the court held that these items are not re-
149. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5547-300 § 61(b), (g) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
(b) . . . [Tihe mentally retarded person and his estate shall be liable for his
support and maintenance regardless of his age, except as provided in Subsec-
tion (g) of this section.
(g) For the purposes of this subchapter no portion of the corpus or income of
a trust or trusts, with an aggregate principle [sic] amount not to exceed
$50,000, of which a mentally retarded person is a beneficiary shall be consid-
ered to be the property of such mentally retarded person or his estate, and no
portion of the corpus or income of such trust shall be liable for the support
and maintenance of such mentally retarded person regardless of his age.
150. 638 S.W.2d at 191. The court drew two distinctions between trust and guardian-
ships. First, legal title to trust property is held by the trustee, whereas in a guardianship the
ward holds title while the guardian manages the property. Id. Secondly, the statute of
limitations, which is applied against trustees as if they were the true owners of the property,
has not been applied to guardians because ownership is in the ward. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 633 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
154. Id. at 651-52.
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coverable against the predecessor guardian in favor of the successor guard-
ian. 15 5 The court reasoned that Texas Probate Code section 245 authorizes
recovery of costs if a personal representative is removed for cause,' 56 but
earlier Texas cases have held that costs do not include attorneys' fees.
157
IV. HEIRSHIP
Heir by Equitable Adoption. Texas has long recognized equitable adoption
or adoption by estoppel. 5 8 Under this doctrine, a relationship of parent
and child can be established by estoppel under an invalid adoption agree-
ment if persons take a minor into their home and deal with the child as if
he or she were their own, and if the child treats the parties as if they were
his parents.' 59 Equitable adoption does not, however, create the same sta-
tus as a statutory adoption, under which the child is treated for all pur-
poses as the child of the adoptive parents. 160 In Pouncy v. Garner16 1 an
equitably adopted son claimed to be entitled to an intestate share of the
estate of his adoptive parents' natural daughter. The court held that an
equitably adopted child will not inherit from his adoptive relations other
than his adoptive parents. 162 The doctrine of equitable adoption estops
only the adoptive parents and their privies from denying the parent-child
relationship.' 63 The court stated that "'[p]rivity,' as here used, is the legal
relationship between parties incident to succession on the part of one party
. . . to an estate or interest formerly held by the other." 164 Because no
part of the daughter's estate vested in the deceased parents, the heirs of the
daughter's estate were not in privity with the adoptive parents and were,
therefore, not estopped to deny the status of the equitably adopted son. ' 65
155. Id. at 654.
156. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 245 (Vernon 1980).
157. 633 S.W.2d at 653; see Dumitrov v. Hitt, 601 S.W.2d 472, 473-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ retd n.r.e.) (attorneys' fees incurrred by former administra-
tor in defending removal action are not reasonable expenses of administration under Pro-
bate Code § 242); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Drake, 587 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979) (attorneys' fees not recoverable under Probate Code § 245), rev'd on
other grounds, 600 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1980).
158. See Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934); Bailey, Adoption "By
Estoppel," 36 TEX. L. REV. 30 (1957).
159. See Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 578, 235 S.W.2d 972, 975 (1951); Cubley v.
Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 425-26, 73 S.W.2d 72, 79 (1934); Ruenbuhl v. Holland, 250 S.W.2d
455. 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, no writ).
160. See Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1963).
161. 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Ct. App.--Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
162. Id. at 342; cf. Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963) (heirs of adoptive par-
ents held not permitted to inherit from equitably adopted child who died intestate); Asbeck
v. Asbeck, 362 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962), affd, 369 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.
1963) (equitably adopted son of intestate's brother held not entitled to interest in intestate's
estate).
163. 626 S.W.2d at 341; see Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1963); Asbeck v.
Asbeck, 362 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962), afl'd, 369 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.
1963).
164. 626 S.W.2d at 341 (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 342.
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Per Capita or Per Stirpes. In Hockman v. Estate of Lowe 16 6 Braddie Lowe
died intestate leaving no surviving husband, children, father, mother,
brothers, or sisters. She had six sisters who predeceased her, leaving nine
nieces and nephews. One nephew had died leaving two children. A sur-
viving nephew contended that he should inherit what his mother would
have inherited, or one-fifth. 167 The temporary administratrix filed applica-
tion to divide the estate into nine shares, one for the eight living nieces and
nephews and one divided between the two children of the deceased
nephew.
The court of appeals construed Texas Probate Code section 43168 as re-
quiring a per capita distribution among the nieces and nephews.' 69 Under
the statute when the nearest survivors of the decedent are in the same de-
gree of relationship, in this case nieces and nephews, they share per capita,
with the share of any deceased survivor of the same degree passing per
stirpes to his then living children. 170 The court, otherefore, affirmed the trial
court's judgment dividing the estate into nine shares, in accordance with
the administratrix's application.' 7'
166. 624 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
167. Apparently, the intestate was predeceased by a sister who left no surviving children.
168. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 43 (Vernon 1980) provides:
When the intestate's children, or brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts, or any
other relatives of the deceased standing in the first or same degree alone come
into the distribution upon intestacy, they shall take per capita, namely: by
persons; and, when a part of them being dead and a part living, the descedants
of those dead shall have. . . only such portion of said property as the parent
through whom they inherit would be entitled to if alive.
169. 624 S.W.2d at 721.
170. The court cited Peters v. Clancy, 192 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1946,
no writ), for this interpretation of Probate Code § 43. In Peters the intestate died with only
his sister's son and children of his deceased brother surviving him. There the court held that
the statutory predecessor to § 43 require a per capita distribution among the intestate's
neices and nephews. 192 S.W.2d at 939.
171. 624 S.W.2d at 721.
[Vol. 37
